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It was recently proposed that infants have a memory bias for events witnessed together with others. This may allow infants to prioritize relevant information and to predict others' actions, despite limited processing capacities. However, when events occur in the absence of others, for example, an object changes location, this would create altercentric memory errors where infants misremember the object's location where others last saw it. Pupillometry presents a powerful tool to examine the temporal dynamics of such memory biases as they unfold. Here, we showed infants aged 9 (N = 97) and 18 months (N = 79) videos of an agent watching an object move to one of two hiding locations. The object then moved from location A to B, which the agent either missed (leading to her false belief) or witnessed (true belief). The object subsequently reappeared either at its actual or, surprisingly, its initial location. As predicted by the altercentric theory, 9-month-old infants expected the object where the agent falsely believed it to be and not where it really was, as indicated in their pupil dilation. In contrast, 18-month-old infants seemed to remember the object's actual location. Infants' memory errors did not predict correct action anticipation when the agent reached into one of the locations to retrieve the object. This indicates that infants show altercentric memory errors at a young age, which vanish in the second year of life. We suggest that this bias helps young infants to learn from others, but recedes as they become more capable of acting on the world themselves.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/desc.70016 | DOI Listing |
Dev Sci
May 2025
Research Group 'Milestones of Early Cognitive Development', Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
It was recently proposed that infants have a memory bias for events witnessed together with others. This may allow infants to prioritize relevant information and to predict others' actions, despite limited processing capacities. However, when events occur in the absence of others, for example, an object changes location, this would create altercentric memory errors where infants misremember the object's location where others last saw it.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFProc Biol Sci
June 2023
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, København 1353, Denmark.
Young learners would seem to face a daunting challenge in selecting to what they should attend, a problem that may have been exacerbated in human infants by changes in carrying practices during human evolution. A novel theory proposes that human infant cognition has an altercentric bias whereby early in life, infants prioritize encoding events that are the targets of others' attention. We tested for this bias by asking whether, when the infant and an observing agent have a conflicting perspective on an object's location, the co-witnessed location is better remembered.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFCognition
September 2021
Department of Psychology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Electronic address:
Visuospatial perspective-taking is the foundation for inferring the mental state of another person during social interaction. Although research has shown that dual processes are involved in self-judgment when an avatar is present on screen, it is unknown whether dual independent processes also underlie perspective-taking. During the three experiments in the present study, the participants made laterality judgments according to the perspective of a seated or standing avatar.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFJ Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform
February 2016
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham.
A growing body of work suggests that in some circumstances, humans may be capable of ascribing mental states to others in a way that is fast, cognitively efficient, and implicit (implicit mentalizing hypothesis). However, the interpretation of this work has recently been challenged by suggesting that the observed effects may reflect "submentalizing" effects of attention and memory, with no ascription of mental states (submentalizing hypothesis). The present study employed a strong test between these hypotheses by examining whether apparently automatic processing of another's visual perspective is influenced by experience-dependent beliefs about whether that person can see.
View Article and Find Full Text PDF